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INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURES, HUMAN
RESOURCE STRATEGIES, AND THE RISE OF
NONUNION DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES
ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN*
The author investigates factors influencing the adoption of dispute resolu-
tion procedures in the nonunion workplace.  Various explanations are tested
using data from a 1998 survey of dispute resolution procedures in the telecom-
munications industry.  The results suggest that both institutional pressures and
human resource strategies are factors driving the adoption of nonunion proce-
dures.  Among institutional factors, rising individual employment rights litiga-
tion and expanded court deferral to nonunion arbitration have led to increased
adoption of mandatory arbitration procedures in the nonunion workplace.  At
the same time, an older institutional factor—union substitution by nonunion
employers aimed at avoiding union organizing—continues to inspire the adop-
tion of nonunion dispute resolution procedures, especially peer review.  Finally,
the results provide some support for a link between the use of high performance
work systems and the adoption of nonunion dispute resolution procedures.
onflict is an inherent part of the em-
ployment relationship.  Given the com-
bination of common and opposing inter-
ests and the ongoing nature of the relation-
ship between employers and employees, it
is inevitable that disputes will arise in the
workplace.  The procedures through which
such disputes are resolved provide a basic
indicator of the nature of governance of
employment relations in the workplace.  In
the American industrial relations system,
this dispute resolution has taken place in
unionized workplaces through highly de-
veloped, formal grievance procedures cul-
minating in arbitration conducted by third-
party neutral labor arbitrators.  In contrast,
for the vast majority of nonunion work-
places in the period following the Second
World War, dispute resolution consisted of
little more than the exercise of managerial
discretion, and the few procedures that
were established in the nonunion work-
place most often soon fell into disuse
(Slichter, Healy, and Livernash 1960).
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However, evidence is growing of an ex-
pansion in recent decades of both the num-
bers and complexity of dispute resolution
procedures in nonunion workplaces
(Westin and Felieu 1988; McCabe 1988;
Ewing 1989; Feuille and Delaney 1992;
Feuille and Chachere 1995).  This develop-
ment assumes particular importance given
that we are in a period of declining union
representation coverage and the growth of
new models of the employment relation-
ship dominated by managerial human re-
source strategies and individualized em-
ployment rights.  A key challenge for indus-
trial relations research is to understand the
nature of these new types of dispute resolu-
tion procedures and to explain why they
are adopted in the nonunion workplace.
Developments in the area of dispute reso-
lution procedures are relevant to the
broader issue of what shape the governance
of the workplace will take in a period of
declining unionization following what has
been described as the transformation of
American industrial relations (Kochan,
Katz, and McKersie 1994).  Pessimists might
predict an expansion of management
authoritarianism in the workplace, with an
absence of voice for the vast majority of
workers.  More optimistic observers might
predict that management, awakening to
the growing importance of workers as the
unique human capital of the firm, will adopt
human resource strategies under which
nonunion employees are treated as valued
organizational members whose concerns
need to be taken into account in decision-
making.  Although opposite in polarity,
these two views both suggest an employ-
ment future dominated by managerial hu-
man resource decision-making rather than
institutional forces.  In contrast to these
perspectives, the arguments and evidence I
present here suggest that although new
work organization and human resource
strategies are reshaping the workplace, in-
stitutional forces continue to exert a pow-
erful influence on the governance of em-
ployment relations, even for nonunion
employees.
What might account for adoption of dis-
pute resolution procedures in the nonunion
workplace?  In this study, I test for the
agency of three possible factors.  The first is
the adoption of dispute resolution proce-
dures in conjunction with practices associ-
ated with high performance work systems.
It could be that nonunion dispute resolu-
tion procedures are adopted in further-
ance of strategies for management of the
work force that emphasize fair treatment of
employees as a way to increase organiza-
tional commitment, reduce turnover, and
enhance performance.  A second factor
that may explain the adoption of nonunion
dispute resolution procedures is institu-
tional pressures from litigation.  Litigation
based on individual employment rights is
one major way nonunion employees can
exert direct pressure on employers.  In the
1990s, however, a new tool for avoiding
litigation emerged as the U.S. Supreme
Court held that statutory employment law
disputes, such as claims of discrimination
based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, could be subject to an arbitration
agreement between the employer and a
nonunion employee.  This decision cre-
ated a strong incentive for employers to
adopt nonunion arbitration procedures that
serve as effective bulwarks against employ-
ment litigation.
A third factor that will be examined,
union substitution, has long been deemed
an institutional inducement for the adop-
tion of nonunion dispute resolution proce-
dures (for example, Berenbeim 1980).
Some have argued that the importance of
this factor has diminished with declining
unionization (Feuille and Delaney 1992).
In a new development, however, some non-
union employers in recent years have
adopted peer review procedures in which
employees who are peers of the complain-
ant decide whether the employee’s com-
plaint should be upheld.  These peer re-
view procedures constitute a new type of
dispute resolution process using non-mana-
gerial decision-makers that could serve a
union substitution function.
In general, the expansion of nonunion
dispute resolution procedures, particularly
those including due process protections
such as the use of non-managerial decision-
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makers, might be seen as a positive devel-
opment indicating greater justice and in-
dustrial citizenship for employees in the
nonunion workplace.  Yet the institutional
dynamics suggested by the second and third
factors described above indicate that these
dispute resolution procedures occupy a
more ambiguous place in nonunion indus-
trial relations.  Although third-party arbi-
trators or peer review panels may, from
employees’ perspective, represent an im-
provement in due process over the use of
managers as the final decision-makers in a
procedure, the impetus for the adoption of
these procedures is the protection of the
firm against institutional pressures from
outside the organization.  Like walls around
a citadel, these procedures help prevent
intrusion by outside actors—notably, in this
case, unions and the courts.
Below, I first analyze in more detail the
factors that may be influencing the adop-
tion of nonunion dispute resolution proce-
dures.  The impact of these factors is then
examined using survey data on organiza-
tion-level variation in the adoption of pro-
cedures among establishments in the tele-
communications industry.  Although the
primary empirical focus here will be on
these survey data, the arguments and analy-
sis presented were in part developed
through a set of preliminary case studies of
the adoption of nonunion dispute resolu-
tion procedures.  The case studies (de-
scribed in detail in Colvin 1999) were based
on interviews conducted in 1997–98 at four
companies.  Individual interviews averaged
1 to 1-1/2 hours in length, and interview
subjects included corporate, divisional, and
plant-level human resource managers, in-
house counsels specializing in employment
and labor law, and in-house general coun-
sels.
Factors Influencing
the Adoption of Nonunion
Dispute Resolution Procedures
High Performance Work Systems
I first investigate whether nonunion dis-
pute resolution procedures are adopted as
part of more general work organization
and human resource management strate-
gies put in place by the organization.  If
there is such a link, one implication is that
the adoption of dispute resolution proce-
dures enhancing protection of employee
rights will be more likely where the organi-
zation has adopted other practices and pro-
cedures that enhance the status of employ-
ees within the organization.  In particular,
a link may exist between the adoption of
dispute resolution procedures and high
performance work systems, which have been
advocated as both improving organizational
performance and enhancing the quality of
jobs for employees.  High performance work
systems (HPWSs) encompass work organi-
zation and human resource strategies aimed
at promoting high levels of employee com-
mitment and involvement in the workplace
in order to increase quality, productivity,
and responsiveness to customers
(Ichniowski et al. 1996).  Although most
descriptions of HPWSs focus on such prac-
tices as use of self-managed work teams,
high levels of ongoing training, and em-
ployment stabilization (MacDuffie 1995;
Delery and Doty 1996; Appelbaum et al.
2000), a few researchers have also included
formal dispute resolution procedures
among practices and procedures seen as
indicating the presence of high involve-
ment work systems (Arthur 1992; Huselid
1995).
Exit-voice theory provides one theoreti-
cal rationale for anticipating such a link
between high performance work systems
and the adoption of dispute resolution pro-
cedures.  As applied to the employment
context, exit-voice theory suggests that when
confronted with problems in the workplace,
employees have at least two possible courses
of action available to them:  exit, that is,
quitting to avoid the problem, or voice,
that is, complaining about the problem
(Freeman and Medoff 1984).  To the de-
gree that use of voice is facilitated through
structural mechanisms in the workplace,
such as formal dispute resolution proce-
dures, the relative use of the alternative
exit option and resulting turnover costs will
be reduced.  The organization’s turnover
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costs are likely to be increased under high
performance work systems due to the high
levels of firm-specific skills and commit-
ment needed in the work force (Shaw et al.
1998), and therefore the motivation to
adopt dispute resolution procedures should
be stronger where organizations have
adopted HPWSs.
An alternative rationale for expecting a
link between the adoption of dispute reso-
lution procedures and HPWSs comes from
organizational justice theory.  Organiza-
tional justice research indicates that per-
ceptions of both procedural and distribu-
tive justice enhance employee job satisfac-
tion and promote organizational commit-
ment (Sheppard, Lewicki, and Minton 1992;
Folger and Cropanzano 1998).  Supporting
this insight, experimental study results in-
dicate that access to a grievance system
enhances employees’ willingness to con-
tinue working for the organization (Olson-
Buchanan 1996).  Since inducing high lev-
els of employee commitment is a key HPWS
goal (Osterman 1995), adoption of non-
union dispute resolution procedures that
help promote greater organizational jus-
tice is likely to be associated with adoption
of other elements of high performance work
systems, such as self-directed work teams,
high levels of ongoing training, and em-
ployment stabilization policies.
These theoretical explanations fit with
some of the explanations offered by man-
agers, in the preliminary case studies, for
why their organizations adopted nonunion
dispute resolution procedures.  For ex-
ample, the Vice-President of Human Re-
sources at a division of one case study com-
pany with particularly strong HPWS poli-
cies offered as justifications for a new non-
union dispute resolution procedure that it
was in keeping with “the spirit of a modern
company” and responded to the demands
of a work force “who want a say in the
business” (Colvin 1999:127).  Although
these concerns might not be important for
other firms, the point made by this man-
ager when he urged his colleagues to adopt
the new dispute resolution procedure was
that the organization’s use of participation
programs, such as self-managed work teams,
to enhance productivity and quality had
increased expectations among employees
that they should have voice in other areas
of employment as well.
Hypothesis 1:  The likelihood that nonunion
dispute resolution procedures are adopted will
be positively associated with the adoption of
high performance work systems.
Litigation Threats and the
Adoption of Nonunion Arbitration
The rise of nonunion arbitration proce-
dures in the 1990s provides a strong ex-
ample of how changes in the legal environ-
ment can inspire a major shift in organiza-
tional practices.  Prior to the 1990s, inter-
nal dispute resolution procedures were only
a limited tool with which organizations
could avoid litigation.  Although such pro-
cedures might reduce litigation through
preventive resolution of conflicts, the mere
existence of some form of dispute resolu-
tion procedure within the organization
could not bar litigation by employees or
provide an effective defense in the event
that litigation did occur (Edelman, Uggen,
and Erlanger 1999).  This picture changed
dramatically in the 1990s as the courts sud-
denly began to recognize nonunion arbi-
tration as a type of dispute resolution pro-
cedure that would effectively serve as a
mechanism by which organizations could
bar employee access to the courts.
In its 1991 decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/
Johnson Lane, 500 U.S. 20 (1991), the United
States Supreme Court held for the first
time that a dispute based on a statutory
employment right was subject to arbitra-
tion.  Following Gilmer, the courts have
held that the full range of employment laws
are subject to arbitration clauses included
in the employment contracts of nonunion
employees, including the major anti-dis-
crimination laws such as Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, and the Americans with
Disabilities Act (Stone 1996; Stone 1999;
Zack 1999).  More recently, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed this shift in the law with
its decision in Circuit City v. Adams, 121 S.
Ct. 1302 (2001), which rejected attempts to
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limit the scope of Gilmer based on alterna-
tive readings of the employment clause
exclusion contained in the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act.
The practical significance of the enforce-
ment of these “mandatory arbitration”
agreements is that they require diversion of
all employment litigation, including Title
VII and other discrimination cases, into an
employer-designed arbitration procedure
from which there is no right of appeal and
only very limited possibility of court review
(Stone 1996).  There has been much de-
bate over these mandatory arbitration pro-
cedures and various proposals to enhance
their due process features (Dunlop and
Zak 1997).  However, even among manda-
tory arbitration procedures that feature
relatively strong due process protections,
cases are still heard by arbitrators who are
generally perceived as highly unlikely ever
to recommend an extremely large award
for a plaintiff—an occasional practice for
which juries have gained notoriety.  Manda-
tory arbitration as a device for effectively
avoiding jury trials may be powerfully at-
tractive to employers who are haunted by
visions of runaway juries recommending
colossal awards.
The adoption and enforcement of man-
datory arbitration procedures has been
extremely controversial (Stone 1999; Zack
1999), due in part to the contradictory
nature of these procedures.  Nonunion
arbitration initially appears to have some
attractive features, such as a third-party
neutral decision-maker, decisions based on
legal rules rather than company policies,
and faster resolution of cases than is usually
possible in the court system.  Yet in the case
of mandatory arbitration, these and other
potential benefits of arbitration are ob-
tained at the cost of eliminating the possi-
bility of court review.  Notwithstanding the
importation of presumably neutral arbitra-
tors, under mandatory arbitration the rights
of employees as citizens in the organization
are enforceable only through an employer-
designed private system of justice estab-
lished within the bounds of the organiza-
tion, which thus becomes a citadel isolated
from outside scrutiny by the courts.
From an organization’s standpoint, man-
datory arbitration provides a powerful re-
sponse to pressures from employment liti-
gation, but it also poses new costs of uncer-
tain magnitude.  The organization must
pay for administration of the new proce-
dures, including arbitrator fees, which may
be substantial.  Although critics have tended
to focus on the barriers to employee access
to mandatory arbitration, in the prelimi-
nary case studies managers often expressed
the opposing concern that adopting man-
datory arbitration would lead to a substan-
tial increase in the number of employee
complaints being filed, imposing additional
costs on the company (Colvin 1999).  Adop-
tion of mandatory arbitration is probably
more likely when the organization perceives
substantial threats from litigation that out-
weigh these potential costs.  Respondents
for two of the companies included in the
case studies, in fact, said that their firms
adopted mandatory arbitration as a direct
response to large increases in employment
litigation following downsizing in the early
1990s (Colvin 1999).
The extent of the litigation threat will
vary with both the extent of substantive
legal protections and the degree to which
the laws in question are likely to be appli-
cable to the organization’s work force.  State
courts vary widely in the extent to which
they have recognized exceptions to the gen-
eral rule of employment-at-will, leading to
cross-state variation in the threat perceived
from litigation (Dertouzos, Holland, and
Ebener 1988; Dertouzos and Karoly 1991;
Edelman, Abraham, and Erlanger 1992).
Some managers in interviews, giving voice
to this fear, cited California as a state in
which employment litigation posed a par-
ticularly strong threat, with plaintiff em-
ployment attorneys in the 1990s “starting
to advertise their services on billboards at
the side of highways” (Colvin 1999:135).
Whereas wrongful discharge laws vary
from state to state, the prohibitions against
discrimination in employment under Title
VII, the ADEA, and other federal legisla-
tion apply to employees in all states equally.
However, the frequency of employment
discrimination litigation is apt to vary from
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company to company as a function of work
force composition:  companies with high
proportions of employees in minority classes
that have most frequently been the plain-
tiffs in litigation under the statutes may be
especially vulnerable.  For example, female
employees are more likely than male em-
ployees to be plaintiffs in discrimination
litigation, and therefore the probability of
discrimination litigation should increase
with the proportion of the work force that
is female (Epp 1990; Edelman, Uggen, and
Erlanger 1999).
Hypothesis 2:  The likelihood that nonunion
arbitration procedures are adopted will be posi-
tively associated with the strength of the threat
of litigation against the organization.
Unionization Threats and
the Adoption of Peer Review
The threat of unionization can strongly
influence the organizational practices of
nonunion employers.  Both historical re-
search (Edwards 1979) and contemporary
research (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1994;
Taras 1997) have provided evidence of non-
union employers adopting practices cop-
ied from unionized workplaces in order to
fend off unionization.  If the nonunion
employer can offer a substitute for the ben-
efits offered by the union, it may be able to
reduce the chance of a successful union
organizing drive.  However, whereas non-
union employers can counter union prom-
ises of improved wages directly by matching
the wages of unionized competitors (Taras
1997), it is much harder for them to match
the workplace justice protections provided
to employees by union grievance-arbitra-
tion procedures.  First, no equivalent of a
union’s representation of employees is
found under nonunion procedures.  Sec-
ond, nonunion procedures typically lack
an independent final decision-maker, in
contrast to the neutral labor arbitrators
used as the final step in union grievance-
arbitration procedures.  This is not to say
that union procedures are without flaws,
but rather that the relative weakness of
typical nonunion procedures can become
an important issue in organizing drives,
where questions of workplace justice are
often of critical importance (Bronfen-
brenner 1997).
Although some have argued that union
substitution has diminished in importance
as a factor in the adoption of nonunion
procedures (Feuille and Delaney 1992),
one of the unexpected findings of the pre-
liminary case studies was that organizations
were introducing new types of dispute reso-
lution procedures with union substitution
as a direct motivation.  Most notably, two of
the organizations examined had adopted
peer review procedures as a “counter-de-
fensive” move (in the words of one man-
ager) to avoid becoming a target of union
organizing drives (Colvin 1999:127).  Un-
der peer review procedures, review panels
or boards are established to hear and de-
cide employee grievances (Ewing 1989;
Lewin 1997; Colvin 1999).  The key feature
of these panels—that the majority of their
members are peers of the grievant—cre-
ates two important advantages for their use
as union substitution mechanisms.  First,
because a majority of the final decision-
makers in the procedure are no longer
members of management, the panels prom-
ise greater neutrality in decision-making.
Second, because employees are involved in
the procedure, there is some substitution
for the representational function of the
union in the workplace—albeit only partial
substitution, given that the panel members
are not actually presenting the grievance
on behalf of the employee.
This form of nonunion employee repre-
sentation also has significant advantages
for management as a union substitution
device, because peer review panels can be
designed to avoid the danger of violation of
section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, which renders illegal some other
forms of nonunion employee representa-
tion established and dominated by employ-
ers.  In its decision in Keeler Brass, 317
N.L.R.B. 1110 (1995), the National Labor
Relations Board held that peer review type
panels did not violate section 8(a)(2) so
long as they simply issued final decisions on
employee grievances and did not attempt
to “deal with” management by negotiating
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how grievances were to be resolved.  The
ability of peer review panels to function
legally within the confines of the general
legislative prohibition on nonunion em-
ployee representation plans creates a strong
institutional incentive for employers to
adopt this form of employee involvement
in dispute resolution to help forestall threats
of unionization.
As with the use of mandatory arbitration
in response to the threat of litigation, peer
review procedures adopted to avoid union-
ization exhibit a duality in their role.  On
the one hand, they serve to enhance fair-
ness in dispute resolution by replacing the
managerial decision-maker of typical non-
union grievance procedures with a panel
on which fellow employees are represented,
providing a perspective on the dispute that
is closer to that of the employee complain-
ant (Klaas and Feldman 1993).  On the
other hand, management’s adoption of
these procedures reduces the chances of
representation by a union that might more
effectively protect employees.  Thus, the
rights of employees as citizens within the
organization achieve legitimacy and are
accommodated, but in the context of pro-
tection of the organizational citadel from
the external institutional pressures exerted
by unions.
Similar to pressures from litigation, the
threat of unionization will vary substan-
tially across organizations.  Unionization
varies widely across regions and industries
(Katz and Kochan 2000).  Beyond variation
in levels of unionization, states differ sub-
stantially in the extent of legal and political
support for unions.  Most notably, “right-
to-work” states, concentrated in the South,
have created environments markedly hos-
tile to union organizing efforts (Katz and
Kochan 2000).  The seriousness of the
unionization threat, as mediated by such
factors, probably affects the degree to which
organizations feel pressure to adopt prac-
tices and procedures directed at warding
off unionization.
Hypothesis 3:  The likelihood that peer review
procedures are adopted will be positively associ-
ated with the strength of the threat of unioniza-
tion against the organization.
Data
The survey data analyzed here were col-
lected as part of a broader study of work
organization and employment practices in
the telecommunications industry.  Follow-
ing an initial telephone survey of establish-
ments in the industry that collected data on
work organization and employment prac-
tices, respondents from a random subset of
establishments were asked to answer a more
detailed set of questions on dispute resolu-
tion practices.  The sampling frame was
constructed by drawing a stratified random
sample from a population provided by the
Dun and Bradstreet listing of establish-
ments, which includes SIC code industry
classifications.  Establishments were strati-
fied by size, with almost all establishments
with more than 100 employees included in
the sample.  Smaller establishments were
stratified by SIC code so that the total sample
reflects the relative proportion of establish-
ments in the three major parts of the indus-
try:  wireline (SIC 4813); cellular (SIC 4812);
and cable TV (SIC 4841).  Because internet
providers are an important new part of the
industry that is not systematically captured
by SIC code, additional ISPs were identi-
fied through the Directory of National Dial-
up Providers and Area Codes of Operation.
Finally, the sample was stratified by the
states in which the establishments were lo-
cated, with all states represented in the
sample.
Use of the establishment as the unit of
analysis, which follows prior research on
variation in employment practices
(Osterman 1994, 2000), has the advantage
that establishment-level respondents’ an-
swers to questions about practices are more
likely to be accurate than answers by re-
spondents at the divisional or corporate
levels of organizations, who are likely to be
less directly involved in practices in the
workplace.  In addition, the preliminary
case study research found significant varia-
tions in practices among establishments
within the same companies.
A university-based survey team adminis-
tered the survey by telephone in the fall of
1998.  The respondents to the survey ques-
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tions were the general managers of the
establishments.  The initial telephone in-
terviews yielded a 54% response rate.  In-
formation from the Dun and Bradstreet
establishment database allowed checks on
the representativeness of the respondents
on a number of dimensions.  There were no
statistically significant differences between
respondents and non-respondents on
whether or not the establishment was a
branch of a larger organization, whether it
was publicly or privately held, or whether it
was owned by a former Bell system com-
pany.  Internet service providers were some-
what less likely to respond than were gen-
eral managers from the other sectors, per-
haps because they are less likely to self-
identify with the telecommunications in-
dustry.  Smaller establishments were some-
what more likely to respond than were larger
establishments.
A random subsample of establishments
was surveyed about dispute resolution pro-
cedures and practices a few weeks following
the initial survey.  The response rate to the
dispute resolution survey was 75%, yielding
302 responses.  This survey used the same
individual informants as the initial work
organization and human resource practice
survey, and it too was conducted by tele-
phone.  In order to focus the investigation
on variation in nonunion dispute resolu-
tion procedures, data analysis was restricted
to establishments having no unionized
employees, of which there were 213.  Miss-
ing data reduced the number of observa-
tions usable in the data analysis to 165.
This two-stage approach to developing
the sampling frame has both advantages
and disadvantages.  The most obvious dis-
advantage is that asking respondents to
reply to two surveys increases the effective
non-response rate.  Combining a 54% re-
sponse rate to the initial work organization
and human resource practice survey with
the 75% response rate to the dispute reso-
lution survey yields an effective response
rate to the latter survey of 40.5%.  The main
advantage of this two-stage method is that it
allows data from the first survey, in which
respondents were not being asked about
dispute resolution, to be used to check the
representativeness of those respondents
who were willing to answer the dispute
resolution survey.  This provides a partial
check on the danger of selection bias.  Com-
parison of respondents and non-respon-
dents using t-tests revealed only two statisti-
cally significant differences on the inde-
pendent variables found in both datasets:
compared to non-respondents’ establish-
ments, respondents’ establishments were
located in areas with lower unemployment
rates (4.1% versus 4.8%, p < .01) and had
slightly lower average employee education
levels (13.6 years versus 13.9 years, p < .10).
Based on these comparisons, differences
between respondents and non-respondents
in this sample appear relatively minor.
Dependent Variables
As discussed earlier, dispute resolution
procedures in the nonunion workplace fea-
ture a wide range of types of procedures.  At
a basic level, one can ask whether there is
any formal procedure at all for the resolu-
tion of employee complaints in a nonunion
workplace.  Although this threshold ques-
tion was asked in the survey, the primary
focus in the analysis here will be on the
adoption of procedures that feature non-
managerial decision-makers, in particular
nonunion arbitration procedures and peer
review panels.  Procedures that feature non-
managerial decision-makers represent a
more significant potential shift in the gov-
ernance structure of employment relations
than simple formalization of managerial
review of employee complaints.
The presence of each type of procedure,
nonunion arbitration and peer review, is repre-
sented by a single dummy variable that
indicates whether or not the establishment
has this type of procedure covering its non-
union employees.  An additional question
asked what proportion of nonunion em-
ployees was covered by the procedure in
question, but in this sample all procedures
that had been adopted covered all non-
union employees in the establishment.
Whereas both nonunion arbitration and
peer review are often part of general proce-
dures covering all disputes in the work-
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place, some procedures are limited to disci-
pline and discharge disputes.  This is par-
ticularly true for nonunion arbitration,
which may be introduced simply to cover
discharge or other cases that have the po-
tential to lead to litigation.  At the basic
level of whether or not these procedures
were present in the establishment, both
nonunion arbitration and peer review were
coded as present if they were used either
for discipline and discharge cases only or as
part of a general dispute resolution proce-
dure covering various types of workplace
disputes.
Independent Variables
High performance work systems.  A major
methodological debate in research on high
performance work systems concerns
whether to construct scales representing
the presence of such systems or to examine
individual practices associated with the sys-
tems.  Although a number of different scales
representing bundles or clusters of high
involvement practices have been con-
structed and used by researchers (for ex-
ample, Arthur 1992; Huselid 1995;
MacDuffie 1995; Ichniowski, Shaw, and
Prennushi 1997), these scales have been
subject to much debate, and no strong con-
sensus has been reached over what ele-
ments to include in them (Delery 1998).  As
a result, I will follow here the alternative
approach of using measures of individual
human resource practices that are consid-
ered important indicators of high involve-
ment work systems (Shaw et al. 1998).
Four variables capture aspects of high
performance work systems, two of them
representing practices associated with
HPWSs, two representing non-HPWS ap-
proaches to management of the work force.
The first variable, teams, measures the pro-
portion of the core work force organized
into self-directed teams.  The second vari-
able, training, measures the number of days
of ongoing training provided to workers
annually.  The third variable, temporary work-
ers, measures the proportion of temporary
employees among the work force.  Finally,
the fourth variable, electronic monitoring,
measures the proportion of time that work-
ers are electronically monitored.  Whereas
higher scores on teams and training indicate
the presence of high performance work
systems, higher scores on temporary workers
and electronic monitoring indicate the ab-
sence of such systems.
Litigation threats.  Two variables provide
indicators of the extent of potential threats
from litigation.  The coverage of state em-
ployment laws is captured by a single vari-
able, implied contract, measuring whether or
not the state in which the establishment is
located had adopted the implied contract
exception to employment-at-will by 1996
(BNA 1999).  The reason for emphasizing
the implied contract exception is that past
research has regarded it as the most far-
reaching modification of the at-will rule,
providing the broadest potential coverage
of employment disputes (Edelman,
Abraham, and Erlanger 1992), and has
found it to be more strongly associated with
employment outcomes than are other ex-
ceptions to the at-will doctrine (Miles 2000).
The year 1996, which was two years prior to
the survey, is used as a cut-off in order to
partly account for a potential delay in the
effect of implementation of a new legal rule
on the behavior of organizations.  Although
state level measures are somewhat crude
indicators of variation in litigation pres-
sures, the sample does have reasonable
cross-state representation, with 44 differ-
ent states included in the final sample.
Second, the variable female measures the
proportion of employees who are female,
which also serves as a proxy for the poten-
tial threat of discrimination litigation (in
contrast with the usual use of this variable
as an indicator of work force margin-
alization and absence of formal employ-
ment policies).  Discrimination laws are
in part directed at helping remedy the
position of historically marginalized
groups.  As a result, where such groups
constitute larger portions of the work
force, the challenge of employment dis-
crimination laws to existing power rela-
tionships within the organization will be
correspondingly greater.
Unionization threats.  The extent of the
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unionization threat is measured by two vari-
ables.  The strength of the union organiz-
ing threat in the state of location of the
establishment is measured by the variable
right-to-work, which indicates whether the
state has passed a right-to-work law.  Al-
though right-to-work laws only directly serve
to ban dues shops, in which unions can
require non-members whom they repre-
sent in unionized establishments to pay
dues, the status of a state as a “right-to-work
state” serves as an indicator that the state
has a strongly anti-union orientation.  This
is reflected in the trumpeting of the “right-
to-work” status of these states in advertising
that seeks to persuade businesses to relo-
cate their operations to these states.
The degree to which management is di-
rectly motivated to introduce dispute reso-
lution procedures in response to the threat
of unionization is captured by a single mea-
sure.  The variable union substitution is based
on a single survey question asking respon-
dents to indicate on a seven point Likert-
type scale the degree to which manage-
ment tries to provide a substitute for union
grievance-arbitration procedures in han-
dling employee complaints.  Although this
is a rather simplistic measure, it is included
in the analysis because it fairly directly distin-
guishes between procedures oriented toward
union avoidance and procedures motivated
by other considerations, such as litigation
threats or employee turnover costs.
Other Establishment and
Work Force Characteristics
Two factors that may have a substantial
positive effect on the likelihood of the adop-
tion of procedures are employee tenure
and compensation levels.  These two fac-
tors do not, however, clearly differentiate
between the various theoretical explana-
tions discussed above.  One would predict
that higher levels of work force human
capital, associated with higher wage and
tenure levels, would increase the incentive
to adopt dispute resolution procedures in
order to reduce costly turnover.  However,
threats from litigation should also increase
with the wage and tenure levels of employ-
ees, which increase the potential damages
from employment litigation.  Given that
these theoretical explanations yield similar
predictions for the effect of higher em-
ployee compensation and tenure levels,
these variables are not associated with any
single explanatory factor.  Employee pay is
captured by a single variable, average pay,
measuring the natural log of average an-
nual employee pay in the establishment.
Two variables capture the length of em-
ployee tenure:  short tenure measures the
proportion of employees with less than one
year of tenure with the establishment, and
long tenure measures the proportion of em-
ployees with more than ten years’ tenure.
A series of other establishment and work
force characteristics are also included in
the analysis as control variables.  The vari-
able size measures the total number of em-
ployees (in hundreds) working in the es-
tablishment, which functionalists have ar-
gued is associated with greater formaliza-
tion of organizational practices and proce-
dures (for example, Blau and Schoenherr
1971).  The variable exempt measures the
percentage of employees in the establish-
ment who are categorized as exempt from
hour and wage laws.  The variable education
level measures the average years of educa-
tion of employees in the establishment.
The variable unemployment introduces a con-
trol for the local unemployment rate in
1998 in the area where the establishment is
located.  This last control variable is in-
cluded because prior case study research
has indicated that local unemployment rates
often affect the exit-voice trade-off for em-
ployees when they are confronted with prob-
lems on the job.  Unemployment rates in
some cases could substantially affect the
threat of employment litigation, with em-
ployees in areas where unemployment was
relatively low being much less likely to sue
their employer following dismissals and
much more likely to find alternative em-
ployment quickly.
Results
Means, standard deviations, and correla-
tions for the variables are reported in Table 1.
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Distribution of procedures.  The means in
Table 1 from one perspective overstate the
overall percentage of establishments with
nonunion dispute resolution procedures.
Since the focus of this study is variation in
the adoption of procedures covering non-
union employees, I have included only
nonunionized establishments in the data
analysis.  Consequently, overall percent-
ages of nonunion procedures among the
full sample, including both union and non-
union establishments, are lower.  Overall,
in the full sample 16.3% of establishments
have nonunion arbitration procedures cov-
ering core employees and 15.9% have peer
review procedures.
Conversely, these percentages only pro-
vide a lower bound on the total incidence
of procedures, since some establishments
in which the core employees are unionized
may also have dispute resolution proce-
dures covering their remaining nonunion
employees.  Procedures covering these
employees, typically managers in union-
ized establishments, are not included in
the analysis, since the dynamics of adop-
tion of procedures for this group may dif-
fer, particularly in regard to unionization
threats that are not relevant for them.  In
addition, the data on work organization
and human resource practices gathered
relate to practices as applied to core em-
ployees, rather than to managerial employ-
ees.
Given that this survey is industry-spe-
cific, the incidence of procedures in the
sample may not be representative of the
economy as a whole.  However, it is interest-
ing to compare the incidence of nonunion
arbitration procedures to previous estimates
given the impetus provided to the adoption
of arbitration by the Supreme Court’s 1991
decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
discussed above.
In a study based on a 1991 survey of
alumni of a masters program in human
Table 1.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of the Variables.
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Nonunion Arbitration 0.224 0.418 1
2. Peer Review 0.200 0.401 0.24 1
3. Size 1.505 3.456 –0.08 0.06 1
4. Exempt 0.377 0.318 0.01 –0.06 0.08 1
5. Education 13.594 1.588 –0.01 0.00 –0.01 0.34 1
6. Unemployment 4.033 1.637 0.04 0.15 0.00 –0.14 –0.23 1
7. Short Tenure 0.258 0.266 –0.12 –0.20 0.06 –0.09 0.04 –0.03 1
8. Long Tenure 0.288 0.337 0.16 0.10 0.00 –0.06 0.01 0.01 –0.14
9. Pay (Log) 10.359 0.488 0.11 0.04 0.08 0.39 0.63 –0.20 –0.15
10. Teams 0.187 0.334 0.10 0.17 –0.08 –0.07 –0.03 –0.15 –0.12
11. Training 2.058 1.595 0.21 0.10 –0.05 0.00 –0.03 –0.01 –0.10
12. Temps 0.049 0.148 –0.05 –0.11 –0.05 –0.02 0.02 0.02 0.10
13. Electronic Monitoring 0.304 0.404 0.01 0.12 0.20 –0.05 –0.21 –0.05 0.16
14. Implied Contract 0.709 0.456 0.12 0.02 –0.03 –0.09 –0.10 0.14 –0.04
15. Female 0.440 0.368 0.07 –0.05 0.11 –0.02 –0.14 0.07 0.09
16. Union Substitution 3.770 2.232 0.12 0.18 0.20 –0.04 –0.20 –0.07 –0.11
17. Right to Work 0.382 0.487 –0.09 –0.17 –0.03 –0.07 –0.04 0.00 0.06
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 17 18
8. Long Tenure 1
9. Pay (Log) 0.01 1
10. Teams 0.03 0.01 1
11. Training 0.01 0.05 0.07 1
12. Temps –0.02 0.01 0.03 –0.08 1
13. Electronic Monitoring 0.06 –0.32 –0.03 0.03 –0.01 1
14. Implied Contract 0.01 –0.10 –0.06 –0.03 0.00 0.09 1
15. Female –0.09 –0.40 –0.13 0.00 –0.14 0.19 0.05 1
16. Union Substitution 0.20 –0.06 0.05 0.08 –0.06 0.13 0.01 0.05 1
17. Right to Work 0.06 0.01 0.16 –0.12 0.04 –0.09 –0.21 –0.06 –0.03 1
Any correlation with an absolute value of 0.16 or higher is significant at the .05 level.
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resources and industrial relations, Feuille
and Chachere (1995) found that only about
2% of organizations used arbitration in
nonunion grievance procedures.  This pro-
portion is particularly low given that their
sample likely included a relatively high pro-
portion of companies with more
professionalized and sophisticated manage-
ment of human resources.  In contrast, a
1995 study by the General Accounting Of-
fice (GAO 1995) found that 9.9% of organi-
zations in a sample of federal contractors
had adopted nonunion arbitration proce-
dures.  Although these results should not
be over-generalized, the finding in this study
of a 16.3% adoption rate for nonunion
arbitration procedures covering core em-
ployees is consistent with anecdotal im-
pressions of a rapid expansion of nonunion
arbitration procedures during the 1990s in
the wake of the Gilmer decision.  Perhaps
more surprising in this sample is the al-
most equally high (15.9%) incidence of
peer review panels, a type of procedure
that has received much less academic
research and public policy examination.
As will be argued below, this incidence
may reflect the strong association of adop-
tion of peer review procedures with union
substitution motivations and continued
union strength in the telecommunica-
tions industry.
Regression estimates.  Regression results
are presented in Table 2, with the first
model estimating the prediction equation
for nonunion arbitration and the second
model estimating the prediction equation
for peer review procedures.  Logit regres-
sions were used for estimating the proce-
dure type variables, nonunion arbitration and
peer review, both of which are dichotomous
0-1 variables, with 1 representing the pres-
ence of the procedure.  Some establish-
ments in the sample were part of the same
companies, partially violating the assump-
tion of independence of observations.  To
deal with this problem, a Huber (1967)
correction for clustering of observations
was used in the regressions.  Groups of
independent variables representing alter-
nate explanations for the adoption of dis-
pute resolution procedures were also en-
tered hierarchically to allow for testing of
their joint significance.
High performance work systems.  Hypothesis
1 proposed that adoption of high perfor-
mance work systems would be associated
with the adoption of nonunion dispute reso-
lution procedures.  Addition of the group
of four HPWS variables did not produce a
statistically significant improvement in the
first model.  Among the individual vari-
ables, only the amount of ongoing training
provided to employees had a significant (p
< .05) positive association with the adop-
tion of nonunion arbitration.  However,
the group of four HPWS variables did pro-
duce a significant (p < .01) improvement
when added to the prediction equation for
peer review procedures in the second
model.  Among the individual variables,
use of self-directed teams had a significant
(p < .05) positive association with the adop-
tion of peer review procedures.  Surpris-
ingly, the extent of electronic monitoring—
which I characterized as a non-HPWS strat-
egy—also had a positive, although only
marginally significant (p < .10), association
with the adoption of peer review proce-
dures.
Litigation threat.  Hypothesis 2 proposed
that stronger litigation threats to the orga-
nization would be associated with the adop-
tion of nonunion arbitration procedures.
Addition of the set of two litigation threat
variables produced a significant improve-
ment in the first model (p < .01).  Establish-
ments in states that had adopted the im-
plied contract exception to the doctrine of
employment-at-will were more likely than
other establishments to have nonunion ar-
bitration procedures (p < .05).  Establish-
ments with a higher proportion of female
employees were also more likely to have
nonunion arbitration procedures (p < .05).
This support for a relationship between
litigation threats and the adoption of non-
union arbitration is in contrast to the re-
sults for peer review procedures.  Adding
the variables representing the strength of
the litigation threat to the prediction equa-
tion for peer review procedures produced
no statistically significant improvement in
the model.  Furthermore, neither of the
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individual litigation threat variables has a
statistically significant association with the
adoption of peer review procedures.
Unionization threat.  Hypothesis 3 pro-
posed that stronger unionization threats
would be associated with the adoption of
peer review procedures.  Addition of the set
of two unionization threat variables pro-
duced a significant (p < .01) improvement
in the second model.  Both individual vari-
ables also have statistically significant asso-
ciations with peer review procedures in the
predicted directions:  location of the estab-
lishment in a right-to-work state had a sig-
nificant (p < .05) negative association with
adoption of peer review procedures, and
greater emphasis on union substitution in
handling disputes had a significant (p <
.05) positive association.  These results con-
trast with those obtained when the union-
ization threat group of variables is inserted
into the prediction equation for nonunion
arbitration in the fourth model reported in
Table 2.  Addition of the unionization threat
variables did not produce a statistically sig-
nificant improvement in the model, and
neither of the individual variables had a
statistically significant association with the
adoption of nonunion arbitration.
Establishment and work force characteristics.
As expected, employee pay levels had a
significant (p < .05) positive association
with the adoption of nonunion arbitration.
Higher proportions of long tenure employ-
ees also had a significant (p < .05) positive
association with the adoption of nonunion
arbitration procedures.  Both of these rela-
tionships are consistent with the argument
that nonunion arbitration procedures are
more likely to be adopted where the threat
of litigation is greater.  Both higher pay and
longer tenure are factors that are likely to
produce higher damage awards for an em-
ployee in successful litigation, and long-
serving employees may be particularly vul-
nerable to unfair dismissal by employers
(Schwab 1993).  However, although consis-
tent with the litigation avoidance account,
as noted above, these results could be due
to alternative possible explanations, such
as higher pay being associated with HPWSs
or even the use of high wages as part of
union substitution strategies.
Two of the variables had statistically sig-
nificant associations with the adoption of
peer review procedures:  the proportion of
short tenure employees had a significant (p
< .10) negative association, and the local
unemployment rate a significant (p < .01)
positive association.  A possible explana-
tion for the latter relationship may lie in
the establishment location decisions of
management.  Kochan, Katz, and McKersie
(1994) argued that in recent decades com-
panies have increasingly avoided unioniza-
tion and reduced labor costs by locating
new facilities in areas of the country where
existing industrial development, wages, and
unionization are relatively low.  In conjunc-
tion with these strategic locational deci-
sions, they argue that many companies also
adopted new sophisticated human resource
practices designed to substitute for union-
ization and help maintain the nonunion
status of these facilities (Kochan, Katz, and
McKersie 1994).  If companies in the tele-
communications industry are adopting a
similar strategy of locating new facilities in
high unemployment areas to reduce labor
costs and avoid unionization, this could
explain the greater incidence of peer re-
view procedures introduced as union sub-
stitution devices in these establishments.
Summary of the results.  The results pro-
vide support for the importance of both
litigation and unionization threats in the
adoption of nonunion dispute resolution
procedures.  Yet the most striking aspect of
the findings is the differentiation in the
types of procedure adopted in response to
different types of institutional pressure on
organizations.  The strength of litigation
threats to the organization is associated
with the adoption of nonunion arbitration,
but not with the adoption of peer review
procedures.  Conversely, the strength of
unionization threats to the organization is
associated with the adoption of peer re-
view, but not with the adoption of non-
union arbitration procedures.  This differ-
ence in factors predicting adoption of pro-
cedures was present even though some es-
tablishments had both peer review and
nonunion arbitration elements as part of
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multi-step procedures.  In preliminary case
study research, one of the more surprising
findings was that in two of the cases both
peer review and nonunion arbitration pro-
cedures were adopted within the same or-
ganizations, yet the two procedures were
Table 2.  Predictors of Nonunion Procedures (logit).
Nonunion Arbitration Peer Review
Change in Change in
–2LogL for –2LogL for
Coefficient Adding Group Coefficient Adding Group
Variable (s.e.) of Variables (s.e.) of Variables
Size –0.156* 0.020
(0.084) (0.061)
Exempt –0.232 –1.066
(0.746) (0.885)
Education –0.215 0.258
(0.172) (0.182)
Unemployment 0.120 0.452***
(0.152) (0.161)
Short Tenure –0.642 –2.399*
(1.021) (1.365)
Long Tenure 1.291** 0.216
(0.609) (0.752)
Pay (Log) 2.023*** 0.533
(0.709) (0.761)
HPWs: 7.63 16.86***
Teams 1.061 2.051***
(0.667) (0.686)
Training 0.301** 0.065
(0.131) (0.129)
Temps –0.324 –4.795*
(1.792) (2.880)
Electronic Monitoring 0.506 1.354*
(0.558) (0.767)
Litigation: 11.44*** 0.59
Implied Contract 1.076* 0.174
(0.575) (0.526)
Female 1.672** –0.364
(0.684) (0.591)
Unionization: 1.41 10.27***
Union Substitution 0.099 0.241**
(0.096) (0.122)
Right to Work –0.320 –1.374**
(0.494) (0.548)
Constant –22.756*** –13.009*
(6.842) (7.503)
–2 Log L 144.80** 123.01**
Pseudo R-sq. 0.1756 0.2551
N = 165.
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level.
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adopted at different points in time and in
response to different institutional pressures,
with peer review being adopted in re-
sponse to unionization threats, nonunion
arbitration in response to litigation pres-
sures (Colvin 1999).  The results from
the survey data analysis provide strong
support for the preliminary suggestion
from the case studies that variation in the
nature of institutional pressures on the
organization drives variation in the types
of dispute resolution procedures adopted
in response to these pressures.  At the
same time, the results also provide sup-
port for an association between practices
associated with high performance work
systems and the adoption of peer review
procedures, though not the adoption of
nonunion arbitration.
Discussion
A central theme in the analysis presented
here is that institutional forces continue to
play a major role in shaping the nature of
contemporary employment relations.  Even
in an era of declining levels of direct union
representation, these institutional pressures
are shaping the governance of nonunion
workplaces.  Yet the role of institutions in
the picture presented here is a more am-
biguous and contradictory one than the
traditional industrial relations vision of in-
stitutions protecting employees against the
destructive effect of unchecked market
forces (Kaufman 1993).  The present study
has presented evidence supporting the
importance of pressures from the institu-
tional environment in the organizational
adoption of dispute resolution procedures.
However, in the processes described here
organizations are adopting their own inter-
nal institutional structures that serve to
exclude influences from the external insti-
tutional environment and thereby safe-
guard managerial power and control over
the organization.
The two types of dispute resolution pro-
cedure examined here, nonunion arbitra-
tion and peer review procedures, represent
especially strong procedures from a due
process perspective, in that they both in-
volve the use of non-managerial decision-
makers.  As a consequence, it might be
expected that adoption of these procedures
would reflect strong organizational accep-
tance of justice norms leading to the en-
hancement of industrial citizenship in the
workplace.  Yet, the results suggest that
adoption of both of these types of proce-
dures is associated with strong institutional
threats to the organization—in the case of
nonunion arbitration, the threat of litiga-
tion, and in the case of peer review, the
threat of unionization.  Adding non-mana-
gerial decision-makers to dispute resolu-
tion procedures may enhance due process
relative to procedures with managerial de-
cision-makers, but it is a product of a pro-
cess of limiting employee recourse to exter-
nal institutions (to the courts in the case of
nonunion arbitration, and to unions in the
case of peer review).  This produces a dual-
ity in the role of dispute resolution proce-
dures:  while providing a structure to en-
force employee rights of citizenship within
the organization, they also help to consti-
tute the organization as a citadel protected
against pressures from the external envi-
ronment.
This analysis helps explain how institu-
tional pressures can drive variation in orga-
nizational outcomes.  One of the more
striking results presented here, confirming
an insight from the preliminary case study
research, is the strong differentiation be-
tween the factors inspiring the adoption of
different types of procedures.  Adoption of
nonunion arbitration was strongly associ-
ated with litigation threats but not associ-
ated with unionization threats, whereas
adoption of peer review was strongly associ-
ated with unionization threats but not with
litigation threats.  Each type of procedure
has a particular advantage as a response to
the corresponding institutional threat.  The
courts’ deferral to arbitration agreements
following the Supreme Court’s 1991 Gilmer
decision enabled organizations to use non-
union arbitration procedures as an effec-
tive bar to employee access to the courts;
and the ability of peer review to serve as a
mechanism for employee involvement in
dispute resolution in the workplace with-
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out violating the National Labor Relations Act
makes it a particularly effective union sub-
stitution device for avoiding union organiz-
ing drives.
These influences of the nature of the
institutional pressures on the structure of
procedures help explain the variation in
the types of procedure adopted.  Nonunion
arbitration procedures are likely to be
adopted where litigation threats are par-
ticularly strong and peer review procedures
where unionization threats are particularly
strong.  Variations across organizations in
the adoption and structure of dispute reso-
lution procedures correspond to variations
in the strength of litigation and unioniza-
tion threats.
Identification of unionization threats as
an important institutional influence on the
adoption of dispute resolution procedures
is one respect in which this study differs
from some previous work (Feuille and
Delaney 1992; Delaney and Feuille 1993).
Perhaps relevant in this regard is the fact
that this study is based on a single industry,
telecommunications, that has a relatively
high level of unionization compared to the
economy as a whole.  Approximately one-
third of employees in the industry are rep-
resented by unions, compared with only
one-tenth of private sector employees in
the economy as a whole (Katz 1997; Keefe
and Batt 1997).  Although research does
suggest that the threat of unionization can
strongly influence management behavior
even when levels of unionization in an in-
dustry are relatively low (Taras 1997), it is
clearly the case that in some industries
unionization is virtually nonexistent and
unlikely to be a strong influence.  However,
noting this difference between industries
implies not that the threat of unionization
is an unimportant factor influencing non-
union employment practices, but rather
that the variation across industries in the
threat of unionization may help explain
cross-industry variation in employment
practices.  Indeed, it is arguable that the
diversity in outcomes would be even greater
if we were to extend the perspective from
the private sector setting of the present
study to include the public sector, in which
many entirely different institutional dynam-
ics come into play.
Although my primary focus has been on
the role of institutional factors, the results
of this study also provide support for a link
between the use of self-directed work
teams—one of the hallmarks of high per-
formance work systems—and the adoption
of peer review procedures.  One possible
reason for this link is that both self-directed
work teams and peer review procedures
represent structures for employee involve-
ment in the workplace.  As found in the
preliminary case studies, to the degree that
management transfers decision-making
authority to employees to improve produc-
tivity and quality, it is likely to find in-
creased employee expectations for involve-
ment in other areas, such as workplace
dispute resolution.
If we turn back to the initial question of
what is driving the adoption of nonunion
dispute resolution procedures, the answer
apparently is complex.  Support has been
found for the influence of the rise in indi-
vidual employment rights litigation and the
new doctrines of court deferral to non-
union arbitration.  Yet, evidence was also
found supporting the continued impor-
tance of the older institutional factor of
union organizing pressures and manage-
ment union substitution practices.  Finally,
in contrast to these institutional explana-
tions, support was also found for the in-
fluence of management human resource
and work organization strategies.  Per-
haps even more perplexing, despite this
identification of three different factors
driving the adoption of nonunion dis-
pute resolution procedures, the current
adoption of nonunion procedures re-
mains limited and there continues to be
wide variation in the types of procedures
adopted.  The picture presented is one of
a diversity of forces leading to variation
in outcomes across workplaces, rather
than a single key factor producing con-
vergence on a common outcome.  Al-
though this picture will disappoint any-
one hoping for the emergence of a single
systemic answer, it is in keeping with the
view that a major development in con-
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temporary industrial relations is the growth
of variation in employment practices (Katz
and Darbishire 2000), and it suggests how
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